Germany’s possible withdrawal from the euro and the Schengen Area has returned to political debate. But Berlin is not preparing to abandon either system. The proposal comes from the far-right Alternative for Germany, which says it would pursue both policies if it entered government.
The discussion followed comments by AfD co-leader Alice Weidel during a ZDF interview on August 23. Weidel said an AfD-led federal government would seek to withdraw Germany from the single currency, leave Europe’s passport-free travel area and close the country’s borders.
There is no government plan, draft legislation or formal withdrawal process. Yet the announcement matters because the AfD is no longer a marginal protest movement. It currently leads national voting-intention polls, even though its path to federal power remains blocked by Germany’s coalition politics.
What did Alice Weidel propose?
During ZDF’s annual summer interview, Weidel described the euro as an “unstable” and weak currency. She argued that Germany had been economically stronger before adopting it and reaffirmed her party’s support for withdrawal.
On migration, she said an AfD government would leave the Schengen system and “close” Germany’s borders. She also promised the return of Syrians to their country and an end to programmes bringing Afghans to Germany.
These positions are not new. The AfD has long called for the “orderly termination” of the euro area or, if other members refuse, a referendum on Germany’s continued participation. Weidel has now brought those ambitions back into focus as her party gains support.
The AfD leads the polls but cannot govern alone
An August Politbarometer survey conducted for ZDF placed the AfD first nationally with 27 percent. Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU/CSU bloc stood at 22 percent.
The rise extends beyond a single poll. In Germany’s 2025 federal election, the AfD won 20.8 percent of the second vote and secured 152 seats in the Bundestag, more than doubling its support compared with 2021.
Leading the polls, however, does not automatically translate into control of the government. Germany’s multiparty system makes coalition building essential, and 27 percent remains far below the level required to govern alone. The CDU/CSU, Social Democrats, Greens and the Left Party all reject a federal coalition with the AfD.
That barrier, known in Germany as the Brandmauer, or firewall, still enjoys considerable public support. According to the same August survey, 61 percent of respondents approved of the CDU’s refusal to cooperate with the party.
The AfD may nevertheless move closer to governing at the state level. Saxony-Anhalt will hold an election on September 6, and a recent poll put the party at 41 percent, well ahead of the CDU on 24 percent. That result would not necessarily produce a majority, particularly while other parties continue to rule out cooperation.
Even an AfD-led state government could not take Germany out of the euro or Schengen. It would, however, give the party administrative power and help it present itself as a future national governing force.
Germany already conducts border checks
Weidel’s promise to close the borders also needs context. Germany has not left Schengen, but it already conducts temporary checks along all its land borders. The government has repeatedly extended those measures, citing irregular migration and security concerns.
Schengen rules allow member states to restore internal border controls temporarily when they identify a serious threat to public order or internal security. This is different from leaving the passport-free area. Freedom of movement remains in place, although travellers may face checks and delays.
A full withdrawal would be considerably more disruptive. Germany shares borders with nine countries, while workers, tourists and large volumes of freight cross them every day. Permanent controls could affect commuters, supply chains, road transport and businesses operating across Central Europe.
Weidel linked her proposal partly to recent migration pressure in Ceuta, the Spanish territory on the North African coast. ZDF’s fact-check noted that Ceuta already operates under special rules and is not part of the regular Schengen area. It also found no confirmed cases of migrants involved in the recent crossings reaching Germany.
The example therefore does not show that withdrawing from Schengen would have prevented the event cited by Weidel.
Leaving the euro would be much more complicated
EU treaties do not provide a clear route through which a country can leave only the euro area while retaining the rest of its membership on unchanged terms. Adoption of the currency is treated as an irreversible stage of European integration.
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union provides a route for leaving the EU entirely, as the United Kingdom did. There is no equivalent provision designed specifically for abandoning the euro.
Germany would consequently need to negotiate a new legal settlement with the other member states. A unilateral return to the Deutsche Mark would immediately raise questions about savings, government bonds, mortgages and commercial contracts. Each would have to remain denominated in euros or be converted into the new currency.
Expectations that a revived Deutsche Mark would appreciate could also move money across borders before the conversion took place, placing pressure on banks and financial markets.
A stronger Deutsche Mark could hurt German industry
The AfD argues that control over its currency would restore Germany’s economic independence. But the country’s export-oriented industrial model could turn the expected strength of a national currency into a disadvantage.
A stronger Deutsche Mark could make imported energy and raw materials cheaper. It would also make German cars, machinery and chemicals more expensive for foreign buyers.
That adjustment would come while manufacturers are already struggling with high energy costs, weak external demand and competition from Chinese producers. Some companies could lose market share or shift production to countries with lower costs and weaker currencies.
Weidel’s description of the euro as inherently unstable is also difficult to reconcile with its longer record. According to figures cited by Germany’s Federal Ministry of Finance, annual inflation in Germany averaged about 1.9 percent from the introduction of euro cash through 2024.
The euro area experienced a severe inflationary surge following the pandemic and Europe’s energy crisis. Those exceptional years, however, do not demonstrate that the currency has been chronically unstable since its introduction.
The cost of a German exit cannot be calculated precisely without knowing how it would be negotiated. Most assessments nevertheless point to substantial short-term risks from legal uncertainty, financial disruption and the loss of export competitiveness.
Germany is therefore not about to remove euro banknotes from circulation or withdraw from Schengen. The immediate story is that a party advocating both policies now leads national polls, even as its route to federal power remains blocked.